The Fairey Battle: A Reassessment of its RAF Career Page 11

  The day’s operations provided no clear evidence that the low-level approach was more dangerous, although it was difficult to draw any conclusions from such a small number of sorties. The tragedy for the RAF was that its commanders were having to work out what might work in the middle of a crucial battle. So far, in sixty sorties, thirty Battles had been lost—Portal’s pre-offensive prediction was coming to pass with uncanny accuracy. In the evening, Newall ordered Barratt to cut back on operations in order to conserve the force for the crucial phase of the battle that must lie ahead. To the Allied commanders, that still seemed a few days away; German forces were beginning to reach the main French defensive position along the Meuse, but it would take time to bring up the artillery needed to cover a crossing. The failure to appreciate that air support could substitute for artillery was about to cost the Allies dear. On 13 May, German forces, covered by a fearsome aerial bombardment, began crossing the Meuse.

  As dawn broke on the 13th, the AASF squadrons had no inkling that, just fifty miles from their airfields, a crisis was looming. Allied commanders believed the situation in the Netherlands was far more threatening; the French were in trouble in the south and the Dutch were asking for air support further north, on the central front. No. 76 Wing (Nos 12, 142 and 226 Squadrons) was ordered to send a flight of four Battles to bomb German forces advancing in the Wageningen area, some 250 miles from the Battle bases. Poor weather in the Netherlands spared the Battles from having to perform this mission but, later in the morning, seven Battles from No. 226 Squadron were dispatched to attack German columns moving south-westwards from Breda, some 200 miles from AASF airfields. It seemed strange to be sending Battles so far to attack targets that were easier to reach from No. 2 Group airfields in Britain. No enemy forces were spotted near Breda, but a factory was brought down to block the route. All the bombers returned. Ironically, just a few miles from the Battles’ home bases, there were countless targets to choose from, and all of them were far more important than any targets in the Netherlands.

  As the day progressed, Playfair and Barratt slowly became more aware that a major crisis was brewing on the Meuse front. ‘[W]eaknesses in the French line between Sedan and Givet’ were enough for AASF HQ to begin discussing contingency plans for a possible withdrawal to safer airfields further south.21 Barratt and Playfair were not only becoming aware that the Allied line was in trouble, they also had an opportunity to do something about it. In the evening, a French reconnaissance plane had spotted Rommel’s first attempt to cross the Meuse at Dinant and, following instructions for passing on information about crucial targets of opportunity, the pilot headed for the base of No. 12 Squadron. It would have been an opportunity to provide real close support for the French forces struggling to contain Rommel’s advance. Authorisation was sought to attack the bridgehead but both Playfair and Barratt felt they had to conserve their Battles and so permission was denied.22 This was a missed opportunity. It would soon become clear that the decision to risk the Battles in the Netherlands but not along the Meuse was a serious misjudgement.

  By late evening, Barratt was coming under intense pressure to use his bombers. General Billotte, the overall commander of Allied forces, explained how the air assault on Sedan had caused elements of the French Army to panic and flee. The German infantry had established bridgeheads on the west bank of the Meuse and pontoon bridges were under construction; once these were ready, the tanks would be able to cross. French reinforcements were moving into place but Billotte needed d’Astier and Barratt to buy as much time as possible. He wanted both commanders to throw everything they had against the German crossing points, starting that night if possible.23 This was a very different proposition to the attacks on the bridges over the Albert Canal on the 12th. These had taken place after the Germans had been given two days to set up their anti-aircraft defences, and the bridges had been very near German fighter airfields. Sedan was much closer to RAF bases and more distant from German airfields, and German forces were just beginning to cross the river, so had not yet had time to organise defences. The bridges were also just temporary pontoons under construction, far easier to destroy than permanent bridges.

  Despite the plans Barratt was making for a possible evacuation, he still could not believe the situation had become so critical so quickly, and conservation remained uppermost in his mind. He would only promise a small raid at dawn the following day. Six Battles of No. 103 Squadron bombed pontoon bridges in the Sedan sector and all returned, although one wounded pilot was forced to crash-land. Encouraged by this relative success, another four Battles attacked the bridgehead at around 7.00 a.m., and all returned safely. It would seem at this point that the fighter and anti-aircraft defences were not as formidable as they would be a few hours later.24

  During the morning of 14 May, French pleas became more frantic. The French Air Force was planning to throw obsolete Amiot 143 bombers against the bridges, a plane that was broadly equivalent to the Fairey Hendon, so desperate was the situation. At around midday, the French persuaded Barratt to join these attacks with every bomber he had. It was the AASF’s first all-out effort. The plan was for the French to attack first; the AASF would then follow. Both forces would then return to base, rearm and attack again. Blenheims from No. 2 Group would then round off the assault.

  Hurricane squadrons operating further north would fly south to reinforce the AASF and the French fighter force. However, while French fighters would fly with their bombers, RAF fighters would still only be providing general support in the area. Once again, the Hurricanes would be operating out of sight of the Battles. They did useful work shooting down several Henschel Hs 126 observation planes and Ju 87 dive-bombers, but this was little consolation to the Battle crews. Some of the Battle formations were assured they would have French fighter escorts, but in reality, these were just fighters which happened to be in the general area on other missions. By the afternoon, German fighters were operating in strength and anti-aircraft guns had been extracted from the columns making their way into Sedan. The scene was set for the worst day in the RAF’s history. It was a day that would seal the reputation of the Fairey Battle.

  The French attacked first. Eight modern LeO 451s and thirteen ancient Amiot 143s, with a powerful escort, attacked the bridges soon after midday, losing three of the lumbering Amiot 143s and one LeO 451 in the process. Between 03.00 p.m. and 03.45 p.m. forty-five Battles attacked bridges and another eighteen, along with eight AASF Blenheims, bombed enemy columns. It seems that some of the Battles were now flying at higher altitudes, which reduced their vulnerability to ground fire, but also increased the chances of meeting German fighters.25

  Five Battles from No. 12 Squadron dive-bombed the crossroads at Givonne, between Sedan and Bouillon, where they ran into low-calibre but intense flak. At least two bombed the target, but only one made it back to base. Eight Battles from No. 142 Squadron set off in pairs to bomb the pontoon bridges, carrying eleven-second-delay fused bombs in a clear intention to attack from low-level. Nevertheless, they were unable to avoid German fighters, and at least two of the four lost were shot down by Messerschmitts. No. 226 Squadron sent six Battles to dive-bomb the bridges at Douzy and Mouzon, just south of Sedan, and here ground fire seemed to be the main problem. Of these six, one was forced to return with heavy damage before it even reached the target, and three others failed to return. Only four out of eleven No.105 Squadron Battles made it back—one very badly damaged machine landed at another airfield, while another made it to friendly territory before crash-landing. The four Battles of No. 150 Squadron ran into Bf 109s and all were lost. Eight Battles from No. 103 Squadron, still the only squadron flying with a two-man crew, attacked the crossing points, some at very low-level, others in dive-bombing attacks. Three failed to return, although all three crash-landed in friendly territory. One of the pilots subsequently died of his wounds, but the other crews safely made it back to their squadrons. Of eleven No. 218 Squadron Battles, only one returned.26 No. 88 Squadron dispatched
ten Battles, four to attack bridges and six to bomb enemy columns between Bouillon and Givonne; all attacked successfully and only one plane was lost.27

  It was the highest loss rate suffered by the RAF in any major operation in its history. Of the sixty-three Battles taking part, thirty-five were lost. Five out of eight Blenheims also failed to return. Those that made it back were so badly damaged that there was no question of carrying out the second round of raids.28 With more planes attacking from higher altitudes, there were fewer losses to ground fire but German fighters had made sure no advantage was gained. It had all been very different earlier in the day when neither the flak nor the fighter defences had been so strong: if the bombers had struck sooner, the outcome might have been very different. A prompt response could have helped to reduce the risks. This was another lesson learned the hard way.

  Did the Battles achieve anything? Guderian’s XIX Corps reported that continuous air attacks had delayed the movement of the panzers over the Meuse, but this would not have impressed Portal.29 He maintained that inflicting brief delays on the enemy advance was meaningless, but he was wrong. In a fast-developing tactical situation, even a few hours’ delay can be crucial. On 14 May, Flavigny’s XXI Corps, a powerful formation with mechanised infantry and tanks, was supposed to counter attack from the south. The 10th Panzer Division was tasked with covering the southern flank of the breakthrough, but the delays caused by the bombing meant that it was not fully deployed on the west bank until the 15th. If Flavigny had struck on the evening of the 14th, the sacrifice of the Battle crews might not have been in vain. It was, however, only a fleeting opportunity. Flavigny hesitated and the opportunity was lost.

  The Battles were operating where they were needed and had inflicted significant damage and delay. They had achieved what they set out to do and, in this respect, the missions were successful. The problem was the losses suffered. If these could have been avoided, and the Battles had been able to continue operating with the same intensity, they could have caused the panzers serious problems. The problem was not how the Battles were used; the problem was how well prepared the Battle squadrons were for the task.

  The Air Staff, however, took the heavy losses as conclusive proof that tactical air support did not work—self-evidently the wrong conclusion, since tactical air support was working well enough for the German Army. There was also an element of self-delusional doublethink. The Battle losses were no worse than those suffered by the Wellington in the attacks on Wilhelmshaven. Never for one moment did the Air Staff consider the possibility that the Wellington losses proved their theories on strategic bombing were wrong, yet heavy Battle losses was taken as instant proof that tactical bombing did not work. The Air Staff were determined to believe what they wanted to believe.

  In fact, the problems involved in tactical bombing were much easier to solve than those encountered by strategic bombers. No fighter existed that could escort bombers deep inside Germany, but existing fighters could escort the Battles over the distances the AASF was operating. More armour and self-sealing tanks existed. The problems the Battle had encountered were resolvable with the technology and resources that were available. Crucially, however, the Air Staff wanted their strategic bombing policy to succeed and they were not going to let any problems get in the way. It would be unfair to suggest that the Air Staff wanted tactical bombing to fail, but the heavy losses in France were very useful evidence that they had been right all along.

  The losses in combat also provided the Air Staff with conclusive proof that the Fairey Battle was obsolete. In fact, the RAF had no better plane for the sort of mission the Battles were flying, nor was the Battle the only tactical bomber suffering heavy losses. The Blenheims were faring no better, although for the Air Staff this just proved the Blenheim was obsolete as well. The Ju 87 Stuka suffered heavily when fighters were not around to protect it, and the latest 300-mph French Breguet 693 attack bombers also had problems on their first low-level missions. The French quickly adjusted their tactics—a 60 per cent loss rate on the Breguets’ first day of operations became a 6 per cent loss rate for the subsequent 450 sorties flown. The Luftwaffe made sure there were fighters available to escort the Stuka. Somehow, Barratt and Playfair had to find a way of enabling the Battles to operate without suffering unacceptable losses.

  Both Playfair and Barratt tended towards the Air Staff view that the problem was the type of mission that the Battles were flying. However, whatever the pros and cons of direct and indirect tactical air support, they also knew that there was no need for the excessive losses the AASF was suffering. They knew there were solutions and, perhaps rather belatedly, they wanted them applied. Pleas for more fighters brought some response, but every front needed more fighters and there were simply not enough, especially with Dowding insisting home defence should continue to have priority, even though Britain was not under attack. However, fighters were not the only way of reducing losses. There was no need for planes to burst into flames when hit by rifle calibre bullets. It was rather late in the day, but Barratt now expected something to be done about this problem. A stiff note to the Air Ministry made it very clear that the BAFF did not want any more planes sent to France without self-sealing tanks. The note pointedly hoped that the BAFF was right in assuming factories were working day and night to produce the necessary equipment ‘without which the lives of crews and success of operations are needlessly jeopardized’.30 The problem and the consequences of failing to resolve it could not have been stated more clearly.

  Until better-equipped planes arrived, Barratt felt he had little choice but to operate his Battles by night. It seems like a major step backwards, but it was not seen as such at the time. The problems the Wellington had in operating by day had forced the Air Staff to convince themselves that accurate bombing by night was perfectly possible. They were convinced their night bombers could successfully hit oil refineries deep inside Germany, and there was no reason why the Battles could not be just as successful against reasonably large targets in the enemy rear. It was a belief that required a healthy dose of wishful thinking.

  The night flying training the squadrons had been involved in now seemed like a stroke of good fortune; the crews at least had some preparation for their new role. Not all crews had sufficient training in night flying, and some continued to be available for day operations only. Squadrons continued to maintain aircraft on call, ready to intervene by day if a suitable target appeared. But, for Barratt, day operations were a last resort in extreme emergency, and the bulk of future Battle sorties would be flown by night.31 It was a retreat rather than a solution.

  On 15–16 May, possibly as many as twenty Battles tried to bomb targets in the Bouillon–Sedan and Monthermé areas. All planes returned, but it was difficult to find any targets with cloud covering the moon and, despite all the aircraft dropping their bombs and seeing fires, nobody was particularly optimistic that the bombers had caused much damage.32 Even these nocturnal missions had to be halted. Barratt feared the Germans intended to drive south and outflank the Maginot Line, putting AASF airfields in the German line of advance. All squadrons were ordered to retreat to the Troyes region.

  Confusion was total. Airfields were under constant attack and roads were blocked with French troops and refugees streaming south. Amid this chaos, squadrons abandoned equipment and headed south as best they could. As it turned out, it proved to be an unnecessary and premature retreat. The German forces were not heading south; they were making for the English Channel. The Battle airfields were not occupied and much of the abandoned equipment was later recovered but, at a crucial stage of the struggle, the AASF squadrons were focusing on saving themselves rather than supporting the French Army.

  Retreating did not necessarily mean operations were not possible. In similar circumstances in March 1918, RFC squadrons were constantly forced to retreat to new airfields. Nevertheless, they still maintained, indeed even increased, the intensity of their operations. The AASF was not trained to think or act lik
e that, although some squadrons did their best to stay operational during the move. The Battles of No. 103 Squadron retreated on 16 May with full bomb loads so that they would be immediately available for operations as soon as they landed at their new base, but no-one took advantage of their enterprise. It would seem that nobody was expecting any Battle squadrons to be operational. The AASF was not supposed to be a mobile force, and the initiative shown by No. 103 Squadron was the exception. There was no great urgency about returning to operations. All the squadron records talk of the need to organise billeting and generally ‘settle in’ to their new bases but, while they were doing this, the crisis was becoming more acute by the hour.33 A new French Army under General Touchon was being scraped together to block the German advance, and de Gaulle was trying to buy time for Touchon by counter-attacking with his hastily formed 4th Armoured Division. On the 17th, he struck north towards Montcornet, one of the key communications hubs for Guderian’s advance, but the French force was soon beaten back. This crucial battle was taking place just north of the AASF airfields but the Battle squadrons were still ‘settling in’ on the day of the counter attack, and did not fly any operations by day or night.34