The Fairey Battle: A Reassessment of its RAF Career Page 9

  Meanwhile, even before Portal took over at Bomber Command, the War Office was growing increasingly exasperated by the apparent lack of any progress with the interim army support bomber that the Air Ministry had promised. A request for details of when the Army could expect deliveries of the Blenheim V/Bisley took six weeks to produce a response and, to their horror, the War Office discovered this short-term interim solution would not be available until late 1941 at the earliest. There was no point in waiting until 1942 for a plane that was not even what the Army really wanted.64 The War Office renewed its demands for a small, manoeuvrable, ground-attack plane that would also be cheap and easy to build. There was no need for high performance or heavy defensive armament as, by flying low, planes could evade enemy fighters and hit their targets before anti-aircraft defences had time to react. These were claims that would come back to haunt the War Office.

  The Army was sure the Fairey Battle was far closer to what they wanted than anything the Air Ministry was offering. Instead of phasing it out, the War Office wanted more Battle squadrons. To the dismay of the War Office, the Air Ministry offered the twin-engined Armstrong Whitworth Albemarle, which they hoped to have in production soon. The War Office had said they wanted something cheap and easy to build, and, the Air Ministry emphasised, that was precisely the thinking behind the Albemarle. The problem was that it was also very large; the War Office thought the Air Staff’s 20,000 lb B.11/39 was too big, and now they were being offered the 30,000 lb Albemarle.65 The gap between what the War Office wanted and what the Air Ministry was offering was widening.

  The Fairey Battle was still the best option available—if it was properly equipped and the crews properly trained. There was now very little time to ensure that this was the case. The last chance for the crews to gain any bombing experience in combat conditions came in April, when German forces invaded Denmark and Norway. An Allied expeditionary force, without any air support, was sent to help Britain’s new ally. Army commanders were soon demanding something that could deliver the sort of incessant attacks the Luftwaffe was inflicting on their forward troops, lines of communication, and supply bases. Sending the Blenheim-equipped No. 40 Squadron to operate from Norway was briefly considered, but no thought was giving to sending one of the AASF Battle squadrons.66 The last opportunity to find out how inadequately prepared the Battle squadrons were had been lost.

  The list of shortcomings was indeed daunting. No Battle had been equipped with the extra armour agreed the previous November. No Battles had protection for their fuel tanks—they were supposed to start getting self-sealing tanks in March, but the programme was running behind schedule, and the Battle was still last on the list to get them. The crews were going to be dropping bombs in action for the first time, and no more fighters had arrived to escort them. Barratt and Playfair were both very aware of the problems. They knew that, against strong fighter and anti-aircraft defences, losses would probably be heavy. Barratt had complained about the shortage of fighters and felt that the few he had would have to be used to protect the advancing BEF. He knew that, without an effective escort, the Battles would have to operate at low level, but there were no efforts to prepare the squadrons. There were no strident protests at the delays in equipping his Battles with self-sealing tanks. The additional armour had been forgotten. Barratt and his commanders seemed to be sleepwalking into a disaster.

  Barratt had plenty of time to complain about the failings of his French allies. He would later claim that the French had refused permission for him to use his bombers to attack enemy columns in Germany once the offensive was underway. He insisted ‘repeated efforts to make the French see reason in this matter were unavailing’.67 However, Barratt’s complaints were not consistent with the instructions the French had sent him; it would seem the French objections he spoke of referred to plans to use the Battles to mine waterways and bomb factories.

  French instructions were quite clear: as soon as the German offensive was underway, the AASF Battles were to go into action. Initially, targeting would involve a degree of guesswork, and the bombers would have to strike targets inside Germany, but as near to the frontier as possible. The only safe area to bomb west of the German frontier was Belgium to the east of the Albert Canal defences, which the Belgians had no intention of defending. Far from making repeated attempts to ‘make the French see reason’, there was concern in Barratt’s headquarters at the French insistence that:

  British Air Forces will attack these objectives immediately on violation of the frontiers and before information from reconnaissance planes has enabled the position of German columns in Holland and Belgium to be determined.68

  Provided they were military targets, there was no need to wait for authorisation, even if the bombing might cause civilian casualties.

  As soon as the first reconnaissance planes returned with more accurate information on the direction of the advancing German forces, effort would concentrate on slowing down the advance of the lead columns. There was also surprise at AASF HQ over French plans to instruct their reconnaissance planes to make for a bomber base if they had spotted a particularly attractive target, so that air strikes could be launched immediately. None of this seemed to be part of RAF thinking.69

  These were the French plans. Unfortunately, the French had to rely entirely on RAF bombers to carry them out as nearly all the French day bomber squadrons were in the rear converting to modern equipment. The RAF would be on its own. Barratt did not believe his Battles could do it: they were far too vulnerable to be used so intensively by day. They had to be used more sparingly and Barratt had no intention of launching his Battles on an all-out offensive.70 The Germans had gained a significant advantage before the battle had even begun.

  4

  Lessons Hard-Learned

  By early May, evidence was growing all along the frontiers of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg that German forces were about to strike. The main German effort was expected to come through central Belgium, north of the Meuse, and Bomber Command’s No. 2 Group and French bombers were to focus their efforts here. The Battles had the less important task of dealing with the expected secondary German drive through the Ardennes. However, as it turned out, the Battles would find themselves in the path of the main German effort.

  On 10 May, German forces crossed the Dutch, Belgium, and Luxembourg frontiers. The German High Command expected the Allies to be strongest in central Belgium, where there were no natural defensive lines behind the frontier defences on the Albert Canal. The Germans hoped to surprise the Allies by making their main push much further south through the Ardennes. It was a huge risk: German forces would have to advance over 60 miles before they even reached the main French defensive line on the Meuse. There were few roads for the panzers and they would be very vulnerable to air attack. German commanders hoped that the push through Belgium would be strong enough to ensure the Allied air forces focused their attention there.

  On the ground, the German assessment was accurate. The best-equipped Allied armies were set to advance into Belgium, while the French 2nd and 9th Armies defending the Meuse were not so well equipped. In the air, however, the Allied response was more evenly spread. The AASF was detailed to cover the Ardennes, regardless of where the main German effort was—not entirely logical, but the German plans might yet be undone by this pre-planned deployment of air resources. Quite by chance, the AASF Battles would have the opportunity to derail the German plan. The opportunities were immense, but so were the dangers. The same limited road network that would constrict the German advance would also concentrate the anti-aircraft defences.

  German offensive May 1940.

  At around 4.00 a.m. on 10 May, German troops began crossing into Luxembourg. The AASF was ready to respond; at dawn on the 10th, Battle flights were bombed up and ready to go. By 6.00 a.m., it was clear the German offensive was underway. According to the French plan, this should have triggered immediate attacks on tactical targets inside Germany, with follow up attacks once
reconnaissance planes had identified the routes German forces were moving along. Squadrons were instructed to have half their planes ready to take off in thirty minutes, and the remaining half in two hours. They knew the targets they would have to attack. To avoid friendly civilian casualties, built up areas were to be avoided, but maps had been drawn up detailing natural bottlenecks on the roads through Luxembourg and Belgium, showing where the most delay could be inflicted on German forces. The squadrons merely had to be told which ones to attack.

  At 8.30 a.m. on 10 May, Barratt set off for the joint RAF/French Air Force HQ at Chauny, arriving there at around 10.30 a.m. By this time, the first reports from French reconnaissance planes were beginning to arrive. German forces had been seen advancing towards Luxembourg City from the Echternach region. Barratt discussed these reports with General d’Astier, the commander of French Air Force units on the northern sector of the front, and around midday he ordered the first Battles into action. It was all rather indicative of the pace at which both the British and French thought the war would be fought. The scale of the response also scarcely seemed adequate: this first wave would consist of just eight bombers.

  Much has been made of Barratt’s claimed frustration at not being allowed to let his bombers loose earlier on the advancing columns. It is difficult to disentangle the facts from the tendency at the time to blame the French for everything that went wrong. After the campaign, Barratt would claim that, even on the evening of the 10th, Gamelin was refusing permission to bomb targets in Germany, but this is scarcely consistent with the fact that French bombers attacked targets in Germany that night.1 In fact, the pre-offensive bombing plans the French had prepared did not require Barratt to seek permission to launch attacks on military targets. The time taken to reach his headquarters on the morning of the 10th, and the scale of the bomber offensive he then ordered, were not the actions of a man frustrated at not being able to get on with it. Indeed, Barratt had made it quite clear, just days before the Germans launched their offensive, that he wanted to commit the minimum number from the 160 Battles and Blenheims available to him. If there was any reluctance by the French to start bombing the advancing German columns, it dovetailed neatly with Barratt’s own plans.

  No. 142 Squadron had the honour of delivering the first attack. By the time the squadron was ordered into action, the offensive had been underway for eight hours and the latest French reconnaissance reports had identified enemy columns already moving westwards from Luxembourg City towards Dippach. These were the targets assigned to No. 142 Squadron. The Battles were to attack at low level with bombs fused with 11-second delays. From the very beginning, the instruction not to use machine guns for strafing was ignored. During the bombing run, and on the way to and from the target, all the crew would use the dorsal, ventral, and single fixed gun to fire on any enemy activity they came across. It must have been frustrating for the crews to be risking their lives by flying so low but have so little fire power to take on the many targets that presented themselves—especially given that these targets included the gunners trying to shoot them down.

  Of the eight No. 142 Squadron Battles, one was forced to return after its undercarriage failed to retract. The remainder headed at low level for Luxembourg and delivered their attacks. There was no close escort: the only fighter cover was provided by six Hurricanes that were ordered to sweep German fighters from the area. It was a tall order for even a much stronger formation of fighters. The Hurricane pilots would never even see the Battles they were supposed to be protecting. As soon as the Battles passed the German advance guards, they found themselves the target for what the crews described as ‘light flak’, but which was still enough to bring two of the planes down.2 Another force landed after reaching friendly territory, with the crew making their way back to their base the following day. It was not an auspicious start.3

  Battle operations Luxembourg May 1940.

  At around 1.00 p.m., No. 103 Squadron dispatched four Battles to the same region. The planes flew in two flights of two around three miles apart. Flt Lt Ingram’s plane was the only one to return. He reported that his flight had encountered intense machine-gun fire from the enemy columns he was flying over, but both Battles managed to deliver their attack. He thought he had seen the second flight dropping their bombs on enemy columns, but it seems that only one reached the target and this too was shot down soon afterwards.4

  Soon after dropping its bombs, the plane accompanying Ingram’s was hit by ground fire and immediately burst into flames. On return, Ingram discovered twenty to thirty bullet holes in the wings; his port fuel tank had been punctured and the fuel had drained out. Ingram felt that the loss of three out of four planes made it difficult to justify continuing with the low-level tactics, but he also feared that operating at higher altitudes would just expose the bombers to greater risk of interception. He suggested in his report on the operation that ‘A fighter escort would help in this respect’.5 It was obvious to the aircrews what was required, but it was not so clear to their superiors in the Air Ministry. Shortly after, four Battles from No. 218 Squadron attacked vehicles a mile or so east of Dippach. All planes returned, but all had suffered damage, and one of the gunners had been killed. Nevertheless, both flight leaders still believed that the low-level approach had to be safer than dive-bombing from higher altitude. It was an ominous bombing debut for the Battle, with six out of sixteen from this first round of attacks failing to make it back to base.6 This was a loss rate the AASF could not sustain.

  As these attacks were being delivered, crews from Nos. 105 and 150 Squadrons were being briefed for their first missions. It was 03.00 p.m. before the go ahead finally came through to launch their attacks. Both were to bomb columns reported to be retreating eastwards towards Echternach on the German-Luxembourg border. The two pairs of Battles from No. 105 Squadron soon discovered that there was little sign of any Germans retreating. As soon as they crossed the Belgian-Luxembourg frontier, they came under fire from the columns advancing rapidly westwards. Sensibly, they attacked these columns instead of pushing on to Echternach. Again, the attack was at low level with 250-lb bombs with eleven-second delay and again, the crews strafed the enemy with all the weapons they had. One of the planes was forced down by small arms fire, but the remaining three made it back.

  The two flights from No. 150 Squadron, however, pushed on to the Echternach region, even though they too came under fire as soon as they crossed into Luxembourg. One of the flights was piloted by Fg Off. Blom and Sgt White. Soon after crossing the border southwest of Luxembourg City, Blom’s plane was hit by ground fire; the fuel tank was perforated and a fine spray of petrol obscured his vision and filled the cockpit with fumes. Despite the obvious fire risk, Blom pushed on. No enemy columns were found on the Echternach–Luxembourg road, but columns were spotted further south on the Grevenmacher–Luxembourg City road. The two planes strafed and dropped eight bombs from 100 feet. White saw three of Blom’s bombs hit the target but his own plane was hit in the wing and engine by ground fire, and his Battle was soon leaking petrol and engine coolant. He made it as far as Thionville before crash-landing and, three days later, he finally got back to his squadron.7 Miraculously, Blom made it back to base in his petrol-soaked plane. Both planes from the second flight were brought down, but one of them, again with the engine coolant system and petrol tanks punctured by ground fire, managed to make it to friendly territory before crash-landing. The crew returned to their squadron three days later.8 Attacking targets so far east was clearly riskier than hitting the first enemy columns encountered.

  Late in the afternoon, another eight Battles were launched against German columns in the south of Luxembourg. Two flights of two from No. 12 Squadron set off to attack columns to the east of Luxembourg City, between Junglinster and Echternach. This was by now a long way in the rear. By the evening of the 10th, German forces were already well to the west of Luxembourg City. It seems strange that the assigned targets moved further east as the day progressed.
Playfair and the squadrons were very aware of how far the Germans had advanced. The pilots on this mission chose to fly well to the south of the German advance, and then head north, in order to avoid the anti-aircraft fire of the units that they would otherwise have to fly over. The planes were trying to avoid the lead elements that they should have been attacking. It seems that the pre-offensive plans had been forgotten.

  Flying at treetop height, the pair of planes led by Flt Lt Simpson suddenly came across columns of troops and vehicles ahead of them in a clearing. After nine months of waiting, the crews were not going to waste their bombs, and both were determined to cause maximum destruction. They circled around to the left and then turned right, to make sure they were attacking along the line of the road. Unfortunately, this gave the Germans plenty of time to bring their guns to bear. Before they had even turned to begin their bombing run, Simpson’s partner was in trouble. His engine cooling system had been holed, glycol was streaming from the plane and the Battle was heading for a crash-landing. Simpson dropped his bombs and strafed the columns but, even as the bombs fell, his plane was hit. The Battle fled the scene with glycol and petrol streaming from the punctured radiator and fuel tanks and Simpson was forced to crash-land. On hitting the ground, the petrol ignited and Simpson was engulfed in flames. He was pulled clear by his observer and navigator but suffered severe burns. In 1943, he gave his account of events in the book ‘One of Our Pilots is Safe’. In this, there was no mention of the punctured fuel tanks that the crew reported at the time. It is tempting to conclude that it was not deemed wise to draw the attention of the public to the failure of the Air Ministry to sort this problem out. One plane from the second flight reached and bombed the same targets, but the other was forced to turn back early when its bomb control cable was shot away by ground fire.9